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ABSTRACT
This paper sets out alternatives to the traditional model of labour supply used to analyse the welfare
costs of income and/or sales taxes when preferences are defined over goods and leisure and the
market wage yields the slope of the budget constraint. The innovation in our work is to assume that
some or all of non market time is used to regenerate the productivity of labour through rest and
relaxation. This model has no closed form solution, but we can work with the first order conditions
numerically for specific functional forms using non linear solution software. We generate a number
of alternative parameterizations of this model through a series of calibrations to the same synthetic
base case data set. Across the resulting parameterizations the welfare costs of taxes vary
substantially (by a factor of twenty fold in some counterfactual analyses), even though they all
involve calibration to the same base case data and labour supply elasticity. These results thus suggest
that a small and seemingly plausible departure from a standard model (even if not in closed form)
that has dominated the economic literature for many years can yield substantial change for
perspectives on policy interventions.
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1. Introduction   
This paper sets out an alternative to the standard model of labour supply in which 
preferences are defined over goods and leisure and the slope of the budget constraint is 
given by the wage rate.  This allows us to explore how the composition of non market 
time can influence both labour supply responses to tax and wage rate changes, and the 
welfare cost of labour income or sales taxes.  These are ideas that have seemingly been 
neglected in analytical work since the days of Marshall and Fisher when physical 
regeneration and degeneration of the human body entered discussion of labour markets 
(see quotes above).   
In its most simple form regeneration is the use of non market time to improve the 
efficiency or quality of labour (i.e. regeneration of labour productivity) rather than the use 
of time as leisure to directly yield utility.  In this case preferences are defined only over 
goods consumption.  The allocation of time to non market activities is still endogenously 
determined but this reflects income rather than utility maximization (which has only one 
argument; consumption).  Choices between market and non market time allocation are 
undistorted by taxes in this case, since either form of time allocation generates a taxable 
income return (which, in turn, is used to buy consumption goods).  This yields two 
observationally equivalent models (traditional and regeneration models) each with 
endogenously determined market time allocation but with different implications for the 
distortionary costs of taxes.  One dominates the literature, the other seems to be little 
discussed.
1   
We then develop a generalization which blends both traditional and regeneration 
models into a combined model which includes both leisure in the utility function and 
regeneration possibilities from the use of non-leisure time.  This model does not yield 
closed form solutions to either individual or household optimisation problems, but we can 
work with it numerically solving the first order conditions for agent constrained utility 
maximizing behaviour.  Changing share parameters on leisure (from smaller to larger) 
                                                           
1 Widely cited pieces on  the welfare costs of labour income taxes using the traditional framework are 
Hausman (1984) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).  See also Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998), and 
Ham and Reilly (2002).  See, however, the paper by Biddle and Hammermesh (199)) which discusses sleep 
and the allocation of time which has a formulation of labour supply decisions related to our approach.  A 
recent real business cycle piece by Fisher (2001) discusses cases where household capital affects market 
productivity and is also related to our discussion.  Neither of these pieces discusses welfare effects of taxes.   3
affects how of additional regeneration time influences labour efficiency and this allows 
us to move between the two extreme forms (traditional/pure regeneration) of the model.   
Treating only market time as observable and regeneration time as unobservable, we 
show how many parameterizations can be constructed for this generalized model each of 
which is consistent with the same base case data on time allocated to market labour 
supply and consumption of goods as used in traditional models of labour supply and the 
same point estimate of the (uncompensated) supply elasticity of market time (labour) 
with respect to the wage.  Since regeneration time is not directly observable there is no 
test available to discriminate between alternative parameterizations, generated in this way 
on any objective basis.  However, the notion that there is non market activity regeneration 
seems intuitively plausible.  It is a formulation of human behaviour with respect to labour 
supply seemingly closer to that used by to psychologists in their studies of behavioural 
response than is the conventional economics approach.  It is also an approach used in 
business literature on the management of human resources. 
For observationally equivalent parameterisations of this model there are different 
welfare costs of the same tax when parameterizations which are calibrated to different 
values of unobservable regeneration time are used in counterfactual mode.  For model 
parameterizations that are observationally equivalent in the sense above, we are able to 
compute ranges of estimates of the welfare costs of the same tax (the ranges are 20 to 1 in 
some cases).  
We also use a number of elaborations on this structure and approach to take the 
analysis further.  We discuss two of these in detail in the text.  One is where some market 
provided goods enter the regeneration process while others directly provide utility.  In 
this elaboration, the usual presumption for a broadly based VAT breaks down and an 
added tax distortion between market provided goods and non market time enters the 
analysis.  Here, the optimal tax on the market provided good entering regeneration is 
zero, but we can still evaluate the welfare costs of alternative configurations of tax rates 
across market goods.  A second elaboration is a household model where time spent by 
one household member with others in the household regenerates both household 
members; effectively cross regeneration between the members of a household.  For both   4
of these model variants, we again compute a range of welfare cost estimates for the same 
tax across alternate combinations of data/elasticity admissible parameterizations. 
We conclude by briefly discussing empirical implementation of the regeneration 
approach and its wider implications both for empirical work on tax distortions of labour 
supply and for policy.  We note that direct observation of regeneration time (i.e. 
separately from time devoted to pure leisure) appears to be difficult if not impossible at 
present.  Time use survey data allows for no simple division of time between leisure and 
regeneration activities since all time allocation seemingly has both leisure (consumption) 
and regeneration (production) elements (sleeping, for instance).   
Empirical implementation of regeneration based models for now may thus be hard 
to undertake.  But the findings we report are disturbing since they seem to provide a 
plausible recasting of analysis of the effects of taxes on labour supply yielding wide 
ranges of estimates of welfare costs and yield contrasting implications for policy from 
standard analysis.  Even if a model is hard to operationalize it is not clear that it should 
play no role in economic policy debate.  Here the model is simple, plausible, neglected 
and with differing predictions to the literature dominant model.  Also, simple labour 
supply elasticities as conventionally estimated have a different interpretation under this 
approach, seemingly also with implications for econometric studies of labour supply 
behaviour we do not discuss here in detail. 
The broader theme of the paper, therefore, is that a range of observationally 
equivalent (even if non operational) models are available for one of the classical issues in 
the public finance literature (the effects of taxes on labour supply) for which the welfare 
implications of policy interventions are sharply different.  Some of these models have no 
simple closed form solution and may seem unappealing to theorists if there are no general 
results or properties, but they are plausible, relatively simple to use, and can be worked 
with numerically.  Importantly they seem to yield quite different results compared to 
those generated by models conventionally used in the literature and also appear to be 
unexplored.  This raises the issue of why economists should adhere so strongly to simple 
analytic structures with closed form solutions giving strong results when closely related 
and seemingly equally (or even more) plausible models incorporating relatively small   5
departures from the simple structure (even if not yielding results in closed form) seem to 
change policy perceptions significantly. 
 
2.  The Neutrality of Taxes in a Simple Regeneration Model 
The conventional labour supply model considers a single individual or household 
who maximizes utility defined over consumption, (C), and leisure, (L), subject to a 
budget constraint in which the wage rate, w, and the goods price, p, are given, i.e. 
 max  () L C u ,  (1) 
 s.t.  () L L w C p − = ⋅  
where L  is the labour or time endowment. 
A tax on labour supply at rate t distorts individual behaviour by changing the slope 
of the budget constraint, and problem (1) becomes, 
 max  () L C u ,  (2) 
 s.t.  () () R L L t w C p + − − = ⋅ 1 
where R is tax revenue recycled in lump sum form to the individual paying the tax.  The 
tax distortion of labour supply decisions in this model has a welfare cost associated with 
it. 
Now suppose that non market time is instead treated as devoted to regenerating the 
efficiency of labour, such that with more rest labour becomes more efficient
2.  While a 
decision by the individual or household on how much time to allocate to market labour 
supply must still be made, leisure will no longer enter the utility function if this is the 
only permissible use of non market time (our simplest regeneration case). 
In this case, we can use the alternative simple household optimisation problem  
 max  () C u  (3) 
 s.t.  () () R R L L L w C p − = ⋅  
to determine labour supply decisions, where  () R L w  reflects the feature that the wage rate 
of the individual is now an increasing function of time devoted to regeneration, LR.  This 
                                                           
2 An alternative formulation not explored here would be where labour productivity progressively 
degenerates the more time is spent each day in the work force.  Fisher’s formulation of degeneration cited 
above involved physical degeneration from particular non market activities (consumption of alcohol).   6
can be interpreted as implying that time spent on regeneration today increase the number 
of efficiency units of labour an individual can supply each hour the next day
3.   
This formulation implies income maximizing behaviour since only goods appear in 
the utility function.  From (3) the first order condition is  
  () () () R R R L L L w L w − ′ =  (4) 
or the wage obtained by supplying labour to the market equals the marginal return to 
regeneration time in the form of the higher wage times labour supply.  In this event, a tax 
on labour supply applied to the budget constraint in (3) is neutral and has no impact since 
the individual simply income maximizes and both forms of time allocation (market and 
non-market labour supply) imply a taxable return.  Thus, rest and relaxation improve 
labour efficiency and after some point diminishing returns to regeneration occur.  In such 
a model, the amount of time devoted to market labour supply will still be endogenously 
determined, but in the simple case above seemingly distortionary labour income taxes are 
non distorting.   
While identifying time devoted to regeneration is difficult in practice since time use 
survey data and other sources only report time devoted to particular activities (sleeping, 
eating, personal care, etc.) which may be interpreted as part leisure-part regeneration, the 
point remains that how we interpret time spent on non market activity affects model 
implications for policy.  The alternative approach suggested here appears to have been 
little discussed in contemporary literature whether in the simple form of out early 
discussion or in the more complex forms that follows. 
                                                           
3 This idea is discussed at some length in Marshall’s Principles (1895) (see p.694, Chapter XIII, 8
th 
Edition), and is also implicit in Irving Fisher’s well known calculation of the large benefits to the US 
economy from prohibition (Fisher (1926)).  Since these writings by these two eminent economists, the idea 
that non market time regenerates labour through rest and relaxation seems to have disappeared from the 
literature.  One could argue that it is implicit in human capital literature, where time invested raises 
productivity, and these formulations are clearly closely related, although it should be noted that Marshall 
also discusses human capital (see P. 561, where the heading is “investment of capital by parents in 
children”) and treats this discussion as entirely distinct from regeneration as do we.  Here, there is no 
intertemporal structure, and time input every day is needed to maintain or enhance labour productivity.  The 
more recent literature on efficiency wages also seems relevant to this discussion (see Akerloff and Yellen 
(1986)), but typically in this literature there is only an exogenous distribution of efficiencies across 
workers, different to the formulation employed here of one individual with endogenously determined 
labour productivity.    7
3.      A Generalized Model of Labour Supply and Taxes 
The two models set out in section 2 can be combined to yield a generalized (or 
combined) model of labour supply and regeneration in which taxes still have distorting 
effects but these effects vary with leisure parameters in preferences and the strength of 
regeneration effects.  For this generalized model we can construct parameterizations such 
that each is consistent with the same base case data and target (literature based point 
estimates of) labour supply elasticities. These parameterizations all meet a requirement of 
observational equivalence in the sense that they are each the result of calibration to the 
same base case data set and each have the same model labour supply elasticity as a point 
estimate around the base case model solution.  But each parameterization yields different 
welfare cost estimates for the same labour income or sales tax rate (and in some cases 
sharply) even though in the absence of direct estimates of labour efficiency regeneration 
parameters there seems to be no clear procedure to distinguish between these 
specifications on empirical grounds.   
This generalized model cannot be solved in closed form and so we use particular 
functional forms for preferences and the regeneration function and work with it 
numerically using GAMS
4 solution software. We assume preferences over goods and 
leisure are CES and the regeneration function  () R L w  can be written as ()
α β R L w + , where 
β  and α  are parameters.  ()
α β R L w +  is the hourly wage rate received by the individual and 
consists of two components; a base case wage rate w  if labour quantity is not  
regenerated, and a regeneration component
α β R L  which is increasing in LR  but at a 
decreasing rate  () 1 < α α .  β  is a units term denominated in dollars per unit time.  We 
use this form for the regeneration function as convenient and easy to work with 
numerically in the absence of any prior literature that we are aware of. 
In this case, the optimizing problem for the household can be written, , as 
 max  () [] ρ ρ ρ γ γ
1
1 L C − +  (5) 
 s.t.    () () R R L L L L w C p − − + = ⋅
α β  
where γ  and ρ  are share and substitution elasticity parameters in CES preferences.     8
(5) can then be rewritten as the Legrangian 
  ‹= () [] () () [] C p L L L L w L C R R ⋅ − − − + + − +
α ρ ρ ρ β λ γ γ
1
1  (6) 
for which the first order conditions are 
  () [] 0 1
1
1
1 = − − +
− − p L C C λ γ γ γ ρ ρ ρ ρ  
  () () [] () 0 1 1
1
1
1 = + − − + −
− − α ρ ρ ρ ρ β λ γ γ γ R L w L C L  (7) 
  () () 0
1 = − − + + −
− α α αβ β R R R L L L L L w  
  () () 0 = ⋅ − − − + C p L L L L w R R
α β  
Given exogenous parameters γ , ρ , α , and β , this system of four equations can be 
solved numerically for the four unknowns C, L, LR, and λ .  The hourly wage rate the 
individual faces, ()
α β R L w + , is endogenously determined.  Even though the individual is a 
price taker in market transactions, the endogeneity of the individual specific hourly wage 
reflects the endogeneity of LR.  Unlike in the simple regeneration model set out above, if 
we introduce a tax on labour income at rate t into this model, this tax will be distorting 
since leisure enters the preferences of the individual (or household). 
The consumption possibilities (for budget) set for this model is no longer linear as 
implied by the budget constraint for the simple labour supply model.  As drawn in Figure 
1 this set has a shape for which (as leisure falls) there is a segment of the budget set 
convex to the origin and then concave.  This occurs since as more time is progressively 
devoted to regeneration, the resulting increase in the wage rate for the individual applies 
to a smaller amount of market time.  As drawn, optimal behaviour involves the tangency 
point A.  As ρ  changes the curvature of the budget set changes, and beyond some critical 
value of ρ  the budget set can become more steeply sloped than preferences in its portion 
which is convex to the origin resulting in problems in computation of optimal solutions.  
These problems are discussed below. 
The equation system (7) does not yield a closed form solution, and hence wage 
elasticities of labour supply cannot be derived analytically.  We can, however, 
parametrically vary w  and/or β  (and hence the market wage), and numerically determine 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 GAMS denotes the Generalized Algebraic Modelling System (see Brooke, Kendrick, and Meeraus 
(1997)).   9
the response in both non market time () R L L L − −  and the resulting hourly wage 
()
α β R L w + , and use these two responses to calculate a wage elasticity of labour supply.  
We use this method to determine a point estimate this elasticity for this model, i.e. the 
response in market labour supply with respect to the hourly wage rate.  We compute this 
in the neighbourhood of the model solution implied by this equation system, even though 
the wage rate is endogenously determined and not exogenous in the elasticity calculation 
and the elasticity is not constant.  We use this to relate the model’s behaviour to existing 
literature on labour supply. 
Figure 1 
The Budget Set and Optimal Behaviour in a Generalized 












Relative to the simple optimizing structures used in existing labour supply 
literature, this equation system will tend to generate lower values of labour supply 
elasticities for given values of ρ , because wage increases generate a positive response in 
time devoted to regeneration as well as increased market labour supply as leisure 
consumption falls.  Current labour supply elasticity estimates only measure the market 
time response not the regeneration response, which appear in available data as a higher 
hourly wage rate.  The interpretation of existing estimates of labour supply elasticities 
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The equation system (7) can also be used to calculate the welfare costs of a labour 
income or sales tax using numerical simulation methods.  We calibrate to a base case 
model solution and analyse a counterfactual solution under a tax change as in the applied 
equilibrium modelling literature (see Shoven and Whalley (1992)), except that for now 
we do not use an empirically based model admissible base case data set for an actual 
economy.  We do this both because time spent on regeneration is unobservable, and also 
because our paper is expository rather than seeking to provide actual estimates of welfare 
costs of taxes for real economies.  We construct a synthetic base case data set (in model 
admissible form) which we argue has loose empirical plausibility given the non 
observability of regeneration time.   
Specifically, we take w , C, p, the market wage rate ()
α β R L w +  and labour supply 
() R L L L − −  as observables and treat them as reflecting a base case optimisation solution 
in the presence of a given labour income tax rate we then set values for ρ  and LR to 
identify the equation system used in calibration.  We assume LR, time devoted to 
regeneration, to be unobservable and set LR at some arbitrary specified value.  This allows 
us to calibrate the equation system (7) to the resulting synthetic base case data set and 
determine values for the model parameters γ , α , β , and λ .  Since ρ  is also unobservable it 
can be iteratively adjusted to be consistent with values adopted for estimates of labour 
supply elasticities (from a literature survey).  The resulting calibrated model parameter 
values determine a point estimate for the wage elasticity of labour supply in the 
neighbourhood of the base case model solution and we can adjust our choice of ρ  so as to 
yield our target value for the labour supply elasticity.  We can then compute a 
counterfactual model solution in the absence of the tax using a model parameterization 
generated in this way. 
Table 1 presents an example of both a calibrated and counterfactual solution for this 
model for both tax and no tax cases.  Here we have chosen (somewhat arbitrarily) the 
values of base case observables to reflect a 40 hour work week, 70 hours as the weekly 
time endowment, goods prices of 1, w  of 1.3, and a market hourly wage of 2 for the 
individual in the presence of a 10% labour income tax with revenues recycled to the 
consumer in lump sum form.  We calibrate the generalized model set out above to this   11
data to determine the model parameter values γ , α , and β  and then compute the welfare 
costs of a 10% labour income tax by comparing the base case data to a counterfactual 
model solution for a zero tax rate.  In this case, ρ  has been chosen such that the point 
estimate of the labour supply elasticity implied by the calibrated model parameters is 0.3.  
This is in the range of second generation labour supply elasticity parameter values 
suggested by Killingworth (1984) and is also consistent with more recent literature 
estimates discussed in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Ham and Reilly (2002).  The 
money metric measure of the welfare cost of a 10% income tax for this model 
specification is 0.116% of market labour income. 
 
Table 1 
The Welfare Cost of a Labour Income Tax in a 
Generalized Regeneration Labour Supply Model 
 
A.  Assumed Observable Base Case Values used in Calibration 
w  = 1.3  C = 80   P = 1  L = 70  () R L L L − −  = 40 
A.  Additional Assumptions Made on Parameters and Base Case Values 
ρ   =  0.479  LR  = 5 
C. Model Parameter Values Determined By Calibration  
γ  = 0.502    α  = 0.357   β  = 0.394   λ  = 0.373  
D. Point Estimate of (Uncompensated) Labour Supply Elasticity 
at Calibrated Equilibrium 
η  =  0.300   
E. Estimated Welfare Cost of a 10% Income Tax Calculated as 
Hicksian Equivalent Variation as % of Market Labour Income. 
EV = 0.116   
   12
4.  Computing a Range of Welfare Cost Estimates for the Same Tax from 
  Observationally Equivalent Model Parameterizations 
Because both ρ  and LR are prespecified in the calibration procedures set out in 
Section 3 and LR is unobservable, the generalized model set out in the previous section 
can be calibrated so as to yield a range of observationally equivalent model 
parameterisations.  We limit ourselves to those parameterizations that are observationally 
equivalent in the sense that they each reproduce the same base case data as a model 
solution in the presence of the same tax, and also each imply the same point estimate of 
the labour supply elasticity around the same base case model solution.  This allows us to 
generate a range of estimates of the welfare cost of a given labour income or sales tax by 
iteratively generating pairs of values for ρ  and LR under observational equivalence.  This 
means that we calibrate the model to the same base case data for any (ρ  , LR ) pair such 
that both the base case model solution and the implied point estimate of the labour supply 
elasticity are unchanged.   
For each of these (ρ  , LR ) pairs and the associated model parameterizations, we can 
remove the 10% labour income tax and compute the welfare cost of the tax in terms of 
the Hicksian equivalent variation as a % of base case labour income.  These welfare cost 
estimates will differ as we change parameterisations, even though they all remain 
consistent with the same base case solution and the same point estimate of the labour 
supply elasticity at this model solution.  For these observationally equivalent 
parameterizations estimates of the welfare cost of the same tax on labour supply can 
differ and potentially sharply.   
To explore how large these differences in cost estimates can be we take different 
values for LR and recalibrate the model, iteratively adjusting ρ  in each case so as to 
preserve the point estimate of the labour supply elasticity at its initial value at the base 
case solution.  This yields us a range of alternative model parameterizations, each 
generated by different ρ  and LR combinations and each observationally equivalent in the 
sense of being consistent with the same base case data and elasticity estimates. We then 
compute the welfare costs of a 10% labour income tax using each of these 
parameterisations, yielding ranges of welfare cost estimates for a series of observationally 
equivalent model parameterisations which we report below.   13
We begin by assuming that we have a target labour supply elasticity of 0.3 (again 
set somewhat arbitrarily).  We again use a base case value of the market wage of 2, the 
same base case values for C, () R L L L − −  and L  as in Table 1, and assume an initial tax 
on labour income of 10%.  We then vary both ρ  and LR, and for each pair maintain 
observational equivalence in the sense set out above, and compute the welfare gain from 
removing the 10% tax for each (ρ  , LR ) pair.  We report the Hicksian Equivalent 
Variation as a % of base case labour income in Table 2, both for this case and alternatives 
where w  changes.  This yields a range of  LR and ρ  values for a given w  value for which 
we can compute welfare cost estimates for the same tax.  In computing these ranges, 
when we increase ρ  beyond some critical value the problems discussed above with regard 
to the convexity of the budget set arise and we stop computation at this point.   
Table 2 
Ranges of Estimates of the Welfare Cost of a 10% Labour Income Tax from 
Observationally Equivalent Models with Labour Supply Elasticity = 0.3 
Case 1  Case  2  Case  3  
w  = 0  w  = 0.5  w  = 1 
LR  ρ   EV(%)  LR  ρ   EV(%)  LR  ρ   EV(%) 
0.1  0.425 0.110  0.1  0.425 0.110  0.1  0.425 0.110 
1  0.433 0.111  1  0.433 0.111  1  0.433 0.111 
2  0.442 0.112  2  0.442 0.111  2  0.443 0.112 
6  0.483 0.114  6  0.484 0.115  6  0.487 0.116 
10  0.531 0.113  10  0.535 0.114  10  0.545 0.118 
14  0.591 0.106  14  0.598 0.108  14  0.620 0.116 
18  0.666 0.093  18  0.680 0.096  18  0.718 0.108 
22  0.762 0.071  22  0.779 0.074  22  0.847 0.090 
27  0.947 0.021  25  0.877 0.048  23  0.889 0.081 
 
Case 4  Case  5  Case  6  
w  = 1.3  w  = 1.5  w  = 1.7 
LR  ρ   EV(%)  LR  ρ   EV(%)  LR  ρ   EV(%) 
0.1  0.425 0.110  0.1  0.425 0.110  0.1  0.425 0.110 
1  0.434 0.111  1  0.434 0.111  1  0.434 0.111 
2  0.443 0.112  2  0.444 0.112  2  0.446 0.113 
6  0.491 0.118  6  0.503 0.123  3  0.461 0.117 
10  0.565 0.126  8  0.551 0.134  4  0.484 0.123 
14  0.681 0.143  10  0.632 0.163  5  0.518 0.136 
16  0.772 0.171  10.5 0.655 0.181  6  0.596 0.180 
   14
Table 2 reports ranges of welfare cost estimates for the same 10% labour income 
tax for 6 cases, generated as set out above, and which only differ in the value used for w .  
These cases imply ranges of welfare cost estimates which vary by a factor of up to 5 (case 
1).  We view these results as suggestive of difficulties in both interpreting existing 
estimates of welfare costs of labour income taxes and labour supply elasticities, since 
what is usually accepted in most models as leisure might equally well be time devoted to 
regeneration.  Estimates of both welfare costs or taxes and labour supply elasticities 
obtained from conventional models should thus seemingly be viewed as subject to some 
unknown variation due to regeneration effects.  These ranges behave differently across LR 
as w  changes across cases.  In some cases welfare costs behave monotonically in LR (e.g. 
rising in case 4, 5 and 6), in behaving non monotonically in others (cases 1, 2 and 3).   
For the case where w  = 1 (column 3 of Table 2) we have used a grid over LR and 
again computed welfare costs to yield a welfare cost function over the LR value used in 
calibration.  This is set out in Figure 2 which shows the behaviour of the welfare cost of 
the 10% labour income tax as LR varies in case 3 (where w  is set equal to one).  As LR 
approaches zero we asymptotically approach a conventional labour supply model.  As 
both LR approaches 30 (no leisure consumption) and ρ  approaches zero we move to a 
model in which there is no substitution in preferences between leisure and goods case 1 
LR = 27 is the maximum computable LR value in this case.  Results from these extreme 
cases are also set out in Table 3, and all welfare cost estimates reported in Table 2 lie 
between these ranges.  These results thus suggest that welfare cost estimates of taxes in a 
generalized model of labour supply that includes regeneration effects should be thought 
of as bounded from above by estimates from traditional no regeneration models and from 
below by zero (as implied by a pure regeneration model).   
In Figure 2 the welfare cost of the tax first increases then falls as the LR value used 
in calibration increases.  This occurs because the generalized regeneration model 
incorporates two channels through which tax distortions of leisure and consumption 
operate rather than one as in the traditional simple model.  These are directly of labour 
leisure decisions through changed leisure consumption, and indirectly through changed 
regeneration activity.  Depending on the parameters in the regeneration generated by 
calibration, tax distortions of the latter can be either more or less costly per dollar of   15
revenue raised, and increasing the LR value used in calibration can increase or decrease 
the distortionary costs of taxes in some cases, as Figure 2 shows. 
Figure 2 
Behaviour of the Welfare Cost Measure for a 10% Labour Income Tax Across 
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The Welfare Costs of a 10% Labour Income Tax in Extreme Observationally 
Equivalent  (Pure Regeneration Traditional) Variants of a Generalized Labour 
Supply Model 
Approximation of Pure Regeneration Model  Traditional Model 
w = 0  w = 2 
w = 2  w = 2 
LR = 27  LR = 0 
A.  Base values used 
in Calibration 
ρ  = 0.947 
A.   Base values used 
in Calibration 
ρ  = 0.425 
B.  Welfare cost of a 
10% labour 
income tax (EV 




EV(%) =  0.021 
B.   Welfare cost of a 
10% labour 
income tax (EV 
as % of base case 
market income) 
 
EV(%) = 0.191   16
5.      Results  from  Some  Elaborations  on the Generalized Leisure-Regeneration 
Model 
We can also work numerically with a number of elaborations on the generalized 
leisure-regeneration model presented in the last section and for these cases similarly 
determine ranges of welfare cost estimates for the same tax from observationally 
equivalent model parameterizations.  These cases serve to further highlight the 
ambiguities in predictions of the welfare effects of taxes using information only on base 
case allocations of time to market and non-market activities in a conventional labour- 
leisure model and estimates of labour supply elasticities.  More generally, these results 
are suggestive of the general characterization that for any given issue a hierarchy of 
models of increasing complexity exists, each plausible and each incorporating 
unobservable characteristics and each yielding differing implications as to their outcome.  
While this may perhaps not be surprising, what this implies as to the interpretation of 
existing empirical estimates of welfare costs of taxes and labour supply elasticities seems 
both disturbing and little appreciated in existing literature. 
 
Multiple Commodities 
The first such elaboration we consider involves the additional specification of a 
market supplied commodity as an input into regeneration.  This commodity is assumed to 
be distinct from the consumption good which along with leisure once again directly 
yields utility.  Thus, if there are two goods C, R; only one of the goods, C, directly 
provides utility and the other, R, combines with LR to yield regeneration services.  In this 
case, the optimal tax structure across the two goods will have a zero tax rate on R, since 
on efficiency grounds the tax system should not distort between direct labour supply and 
regeneration activity as a mechanism for generating income.  A broadly based sales or 
value added tax will thus no longer be optimal in this case.   
Here, if regeneration involves a similar functional form with R and LR as Cobb 
Douglas inputs to regeneration, the individual optimisation in (7) becomes 
 max  () [] ρ ρ ρ γ γ
1
1 L C − +  (8) 
 s.t.    ( )() R R R C L L L R L w R P C P − − + = ⋅ + ⋅
2 1 α α β    17
where PC and PR are now the prices of consumption and regeneration input goods. 
This yields the Legrangian 




α α ρ ρ ρ β λ γ γ  (9) 
for which the system of first order conditions can be written as 
  () [] 0 1
1
1
1 = − − +
− −
C P L C C λ γ γ γ ρ ρ ρ ρ  
  () () [] () 0 1 1
2 1 1
1
1 = + − − + −
− − α α ρ ρ ρ ρ β λ γ γ γ R L w L C L R   
  () ( ) 0
2 1 2 1 1
1 = + − − −
− α α α α β β α R L w R L L L L R R R  (10) 
  () 0
1 2 1
2 = − − −
−
R R R P L R L L L
α α β α  
  ( )() 0
2 1 = − − − − + R P C P L L L R L w R C R R
α α β  
In contrast to the model set out in section 4 above, this now implies a system of five 
equations in five unknowns, C, R, L, LR, and λ .  The exogenous parameters are now γ , ρ , 
α 1, α 2, and β .  We can again calibrate this model in the presence of a labour income tax 
and then eliminate the labour income tax and compute the welfare cost of the tax.  This 
tax will now be distorting both since leisure is in household preferences and two inputs, 
one market provided and the other non market provided, enter regeneration activities as 
inputs.  An added tax distortion thus enters relative to the model used in the earlier 
section. 
We have executed similar experiments to those which we report on in section 4 
above with this model. We calibrate to a similar base case data set and labour supply 
elasticity estimate for assumed values of ρ , LR and R.  We can once again change the 
values of LR or R and iteratively change values of ρ  so as to preserve a particular value of 
the point estimate of the labour supply elasticity in the neighbourhood of the base case.   
Table 4 reports estimates of ranges of welfare costs for the same 10% labour 
income tax using this elaborated version of the leisure-regeneration model.  Here we can 
explore more combinations of variations in observationally equivalent parameterisations 
than in the case of the earlier model.  We report two.  In one, we vary w  and R given 
values for LR and C.  These results suggest considerably larger ranges of welfare cost 
estimates because of the added input distortion and its effects in distorting optimizing   18
decisions between L and C.  In case 4, where w  = 0.5, ranges of estimated welfare costs 
exceed 20:1. 
Table 4 
Ranges of Welfare Cost Estimates for a 10% Labour Income Tax from 
Observationally Equivalent Parameterizations for a Multiple Commodity Model 
with Labour Supply Elasticity of 0.3 
A. Varying w  and LR given R and C 
Case 1  Case  2  Case  3  
w  = 0.5  w  = 1  w  = 1.7 
w = 2, R=1,C=79  w = 2, R=1,C=79  w = 2, R=1,C=79 
LR  ρ   EV(%)  LR  ρ   EV(%)  LR  ρ   EV(%) 
1  0.434 0.118  1  0.434 0.118  1  0.434 0.119 
5  0.473 0.120  5  0.476 0.123  2  0.449 0.124 
10  0.537 0.121  10  0.547 0.127  3  0.468 0.131 
15  0.618 0.112  15  0.649 0.125  4  0.498 0.144 
20  0.727 0.092  20  0.790 0.112  5  0.556 0.181 
 
A. Varying w , R (and C) given LR   
Case 4  Case 5  Case 6 
w  = 0.5  w  = 1  w  = 1.7 
w = 2, LR =1, C = 80 - R  w = 2, LR =1, C = 80 - R  w = 2, LR =1, C = 80 - R 
R  ρ   EV(%)  R  ρ   EV(%)  R  ρ   EV(%) 
1  0.434 0.118  1  0.434 0.118  1  0.434 0.119 
10  0.434 0.202  10  0.430 0.218  3  0.430 0.140 
15  0.433 0.280  15  0.419 0.342  5  0.426 0.205 
25  0.427 0.611  20  0.399 0.631  7  0.396 0.451 
35  0.455 2.323  25  0.403 1.948  7.9  0.430 1.586 
 
The optimal commodity tax structure for this version of the generalized model 
involves a zero tax rate on R
5, but we can still use this model to compute the welfare costs 
of non uniform tax structures.  We consider 3 cases involving different tax rates for R and 
C, each of which raises the same revenue in the base case.  We report a range of welfare 
cost estimates for these 3 tax rate configurations, using similar ranges of adjustment in LR 
to those set out in Table 4 in each case.  Results from these are reported in Table 5.  The 
varying ranges of estimates of welfare costs of taxes adds further ambiguity to any policy 
prescriptions based on these structures.   19
Table 5 
Ranges of Welfare Cost Estimates of Yield Equivalent Non Uniform Tax Rates on C 
and R Corresponding to Similar Ranges of (LR, ρ ) Variation in Table 3 
Value 









 (LR,R) values 
preserving labour 
supply elasticity of 0.3 
EV from tax elimination 
for each (LR, ρ ) pair 
 (as % of base case income) 
10% 10% (1,1)    (20,1)  0.118  0.112 
10% 10% (1,24)    1.402   
5%  10.1% (1,1)    (20,1) 0.116  0.114 
5% 12.1%  (1,24)    0.701  
0%  10.1% (1,1)    (19,1) 0.115  0.113 
 
 
w = 1 
0% 14.3%  (1,24)    0.412  
 
Household Behaviour 
A second elaboration on the generalized leisure-regeneration model set out above 
considers regeneration within the household such that there are also cross effects between 
household members.  In this case, the time devoted to regeneration by each household 
member also regenerates the labour (in efficiency terms) of the other household members.  
In this case, members of the household benefit positively from each other’s company 
(negative effects could also be considered). 
Thus, if regeneration activity for each household member involves a similar 
functional form to that used for LR in (7) and the household optimisation problem 
involves a CES utility function defined over each individual’s consumption of goods and 
leisure, optimisation implies 
 max  [] ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ γ γ γ γ
1
2 4 1 3 2 2 1 1 L L C C + + +  (11) 






1 2 2 2
2 1 1 1







R R c c
L L w w
L L w w
L L L w L L L w C p C p
+ =
+ =
− − + − − = +
 
where the parameters α 2, and α 4 reflect cross regeneration effects, and LR1 and LR2 are 
time devoted to regeneration activities by household members 1 and 2. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 This is because, as discussed above, all returns to regeneration activity are fully taxed as additional labour 
income.   20
This yields the Legrangian, 
‹=[] () () [] 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1
1
2 4 1 3 2 2 1 1 C p C p L L L w L L L w L L C C c c R R − − − − + − − + + + + λ γ γ γ γ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ  (12) 
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L L w w




for which a system of first order conditions can be written as 
  [] 0
1
1
2 4 1 3 2 2 1 1
1
1 1 = − + + +
− − p L L C C C λ γ γ γ γ γ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ  
  [] 0
1
1
2 4 1 3 2 2 1 1
1
2 2 = − + + +
− − p L L C C C λ γ γ γ γ γ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ  
  [] 0 1
1
1
2 4 1 3 2 2 1 1
1
1 3 = − + + +
− − w L L C C L λ γ γ γ γ γ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ   
  [] 0 2
1
1
2 4 1 3 2 2 1 1
1
2 4 = − + + +
− − w L L C C L λ γ γ γ γ γ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ    (13) 
  () () 0 1
1
1 2 2 4 2 2 2
1
1 1 1 1 1
4 3 2 1 = − − − + − −
− − w L L L L L L L L L L R R R R R R
α α α α β α β α  
  () () 0 2 1
1
2 2 3 2 2
1
2 1 1 2 1 1
4 3 2 1 = − − − + − −
− − w L L L L L L L L L L R R R R R R
α α α α β α β α  
  () () 0 2 2 2 1 1 1 = ⋅ − − − + − − C p L L L w L L L w c R R  
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This yields a system of seven equations in seven unknowns, C1, C2, L1, L2, LR1, LR2, 
and λ .  This system has 11 parameters γ 1, γ 2, γ 3,  4 γ , ρ 1, α 1, α 2, α 3, α 4 and β 1, β 2 (10 if we 





i γ ).  For this model to be identified and useable in calibration 
mode identifying restrictions must be used.  For simplicity, we have again assumed a 
value for ρ   and then arbitrarily assumed that α ’s and β ’s are related in ratio form i.e. we 
assume a ratio of α 2/α 4, α 1/α 3 and β 1/β 2.  These identifying restrictions can be set as 
desired so as to yield stronger or weaker cross regeneration effects, but affect the ranges 
of welfare cost estimates we can generate. 
This model form is more complex to work with numerically than the single agent 
formulations set out above since two elasticities are involved with cross effects.  Thus 
changes in ρ  affect the labour supply elasticity of the second household member and vice   21
versa, and hence iterations on ρ  must be made with corresponding variations in LR for 
both household members.   
Results using this model variant are presented in Table 6 using a variant with data 
similar to above but now for a two member household.
6  In this case calibration to two 
separate labour supply elasticities, one for each household member, is involved (we 
assume these are both 0.3).  These results show ranges of welfare cost estimates for a 
10% labour income tax on both household members.  These ranges are smaller than for 
Table 2 since cross effects between household members now enter. 
 
Table 6 
Range of Welfare Costs Estimates for 10% Labour Income Tax on Both Household 
Members in a Generalized Household Regeneration Model with Labour Supply 
Elasticity of each household member = 0.3 
Identifying Restrictions: α 2=α 4 , α 3=α 4, β 1=β 2 
Case 1  Case  2  Case  3  
w  = 0  w  = 0.5  w  = 1 
w = 2  w = 2  w = 2 
LR  ρ   EV(%)  LR  ρ   EV(%)  LR  ρ   EV(%) 
1  0.433 0.196  1  0.433 0.196  1  0.433 0.196 
5  0.472 0.216  5  0.473 0.217  5  0.475 0.219 
10  0.532 0.241  10  0.535 0.245  10 0.544 0.258 
15  0.608 0.264  15  0.617 0.277  15 0.642 0.320 
20  0.711 0.288  20  0.725 0.315  20 0.777 0.456 
24  0.823 0.313  22  0.779 0.335  22 0.848 0.595 
 
Case 4  Case  5  Case  6  
w  = 1.3  w  = 1.5  w  = 1.7 
w = 2  w = 2  w = 2 
LR  ρ   EV(%)  LR  ρ   EV(%)  LR  ρ   EV(%) 
1  0.434 0.196  1  0.434 0.196  1  0.434 0.197 
5  0.478 0.223  5  0.484 0.231  5  0.518 0.283 
9  0.544 0.271  9  0.586 0.350  6  0.596 0.446 
                                                           
6 Each household member has base case model solution values equal to those used in the model generating 
results in Table 1.   22
6.     Empirical Implementation of Regeneration Models 
While the numerical results we report above are only suggestive rather then 
definitive, they are in our view disturbing.  We have been able to use seemingly plausible 
modifications and extensions to the traditional model of labour supply widely used to 
estimate labour supply elasticities and compute a range of welfare cost estimates for the 
same tax from observationally equivalent model specifications.  While not yielding a 
closed form solution, the model we work with can nonetheless be used numerically and 
yields differing results from conventional models.  In its more general form, we are able 
to show how there can be a wide range of estimates of the welfare costs of the same tax 
for observationally equivalent specifications of the same model, in which calibration 
replicates both base case data and elasticity responses.  
The response from an empirically trained economist may be that there must surely 
be some way of discriminating among these estimates and thus narrow the range.  There 
must surely be an empirical test which can be used for deciding which estimate to accept.  
To us, the disturbing feature of our analysis seems to be that, while plausible, 
regeneration based labour supply models seem also to be non-operational on empirical 
grounds.  The notion that a certain amount of non-labour time goes to regeneration rather 
than pure leisure seems appealing, but no data seems to exist which allows regeneration 
and leisure attributes of time use to be distinguished.  Sleep, for instance, seemingly has 
both attributes.  Eating food similarly likely has both.  Time use survey data as currently 
collected yields no direct information as to how time is employed in regeneration, nor its 
effects on households and market productivity.  Short of direct estimation of the labour 
productivity effects of time devoted to various regeneration type activities there seems to 
be no data that can be directly used to parameterise the model. 
Snippets of data seemingly exist in the efficiency wage literature for developing 
countries, where daily caloric intake is related to labour productivity at performing 
various tasks.  But for developed countries such information is, to our knowledge, 
unavailable and so for now we conclude that the regeneration labour supply model should 
be viewed as important but effectively non-operational. 
Should a non operational model of labour supply yielding different implications for 
the welfare costs of taxes be rejected as lacking any empirical basis, and work in the area   23
only concentrate on conventional implementable models?  Our contention is that there is 
no basis for this conclusion.  The model we present seems plausible and interesting.  It 
generalizes the existing literature dominant model.  The reaction we have received to our 
work from other economists is that this model is both plausible and interesting.  In 
implicit form it is in both Marshall and Fisher.  The differences in results we report are 
striking.  Our conclusion, therefore, is that conventional estimates of welfare costs must 
be evaluated as reflecting a subjective judgement call that other plausible structures 
which could potentially yield sharply differing results are rejected.  The basis for such 
rejection seems to us unclear and unproven relative to the scientific standards to which 
much of modern economics aspires. 
 
7. Concluding  Remarks 
In this paper, we present a model of labour supply behaviour in which the 
allocation of time to non market activity reflects the impact of time on the regeneration of 
labour productivity.  This can be in place of time which enters preferences as leisure or 
coexist with leisure time.  In a simple model in which all non market time goes to 
regeneration because households now income maximize a labour income tax has no 
impact on either welfare or labour supply even though labour supply is endogenously 
determined.  This is in contrast to the conventional model of labour supply in which 
utility is defined over goods and leisure and no regeneration occurs. 
Between these two extremes is a generalization of both conventional leisure based 
and regeneration models which nests both models time is devoted both to leisure and to 
regeneration activity.  This model has no closed form solution, but we can work with the 
resulting analytical structure numerically.  To do this we assume that time separately 
allocated to leisure and regeneration are unobservable and by varying weights on leisure 
and elasticities in CES preferences we generate a series of model parameterizations 
which are observationally equivalent in the sense that they all yield the same optimizing 
behaviour and all have the same implied point estimate for the labour supply elasticity 
around this model solution.  Importantly, however, in combination they generate a range 
of welfare cost estimates for a given tax on labour income.   24
We also consider several generalizations of the joint leisure/regeneration model the 
first of which incorporates separate market provided consumption goods and goods which 
only enter regeneration as inputs.  We also incorporate regeneration activities by multiple 
members of a household into a household based model.  Similar exercises can be 
performed and further ranges of welfare costs computed for those model variants.  The 
same themes of results remain but quantitative dimensions of ranges change. 
We conclude by briefly discussing the empirical operationality of regeneration 
based models.  We suggest they are analytically appealing, but little or no data exists in 
which regeneration and leisure are separated (sleep, for instance, involves both).  We also 
highlight the dilemma that such models, while seemingly non operational, are hard to 
reject since they generalize conventional models while giving different numerical 
predictions of outcomes under tax or market wage changes (w ).   
We conclude by posing the wider dilemmas this work raises for modern economic 
analysis.  Should non operational but appealing generalizations of simple standard 
models be used to guide policy debates when their model predictions can differ sharply 
from those of simple models.  What form of data should now be collected to guide model 
parameterizations of models in this light?  How can subjectivity in model use in 
economics be dealt with?  None of these questions have easy answers in our view, and 
nor does the question what is the welfare cost of a labour income (or sales) tax. 
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